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Abstract: The paper offers a theoretical investigation regarding the sources of normativity in practical argument
from the following perspective: Do we need objectively-minded, unbiased arguers or can we count on “good”
argumentative processes in which individual biases cancel each other out? I will address this problem by analysing a
detailed structure of practical argument and its varieties. I will argue that given the structure proposed, biased
advocacy upholds reasonableness whenever the argumentative activity is adequately designed.
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1. Introduction
In a recent contribution to a book called Weighing Reasons (Lord & Maguire, Eds., 2016), Ruth
Chang proposes a comparative theory of practical reason. She captures the problem and offers its
basic solution at the very beginning of her chapter:
What grounds objectively rational choice? […] The answer I propose is what I
call “comparativism.” According to comparativism, comparative facts are what
make a choice objectively correct; they are that in virtue of which a choice is
objectively rational or what one has most or sufficient normative reason to do.
(Chang, 2016, pp. 213-214)
The solution thus rests on the notion of “comparative facts” capturing basic comparison
relations: better than, worse than and equally good. In a “well-formed choice situation”—“one in
which there is a determinate and small set of alternatives” to choose from—it is rational to go for
the alternative X whenever “X is better than Y [Z, etc.] with respect to p,”1 where p is a
“covering consideration,” such as beauty or efficiency (Chang, 2016, p. 215, 217). As simple as
it may seem, with all arguments laid out and all footnotes carefully filled in (see also Chang,
2002; 2004), comparativism makes a comparatively strong theory of the normative grounds of
practical reason.
Chang is quick to specify that she offers a theory of practical reason and not of practical
reasoning: it doesn’t tell us “how we should arrive at rational choice” but “instead that in virtue
of which a choice is rational, however we should arrive at it” [emphasis in original] (Chang,
2016, p. 216). The idea that “the correct decision procedure determines the correct ground of
rational choice” (Chang, 2016, p. 216, fn. 4) is thus deemed “controversial” and abandoned.
This last move is, of course, well-known to argumentation scholars. If arguments are
abstract objects existing in a Fregean realm of otherworldly ontology where their correctness is
Or, in some cases, “equally good.” Chang also recognises other comparative relations—such as “on a par”—which
extend comparativism beyond the standard trichotomy of better than, worse than and equally good. See Chang
(2002).
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exclusively established, then argumentation theory is merely a theory of the uses of arguments,
of actual processes and procedures that may bring us closer to the good arguments, defined out
there. Normatively speaking, it thus becomes a theory of approximation (how might we get
there, as close as we can), rather than a theory of “rational,” “objective grounds” of “normative
reasons.”
Unsurprisingly, such philosophical views do not have much currency among
communication scholars. For them, the immanent or internal (as opposed to transcendent or
external) normativity of argumentation is a fundamental part of human communication. For
Wenzel (1990), all three perspectives on argument – that of logical product, dialectical procedure
and rhetorical process – are equally relevant, “equally good” might we say, normative takes on
the human practices of argument. Craig and Tracy (1995) go a step further and find the
normative grounds for communication in the very thick of communicative practices; ideals are
thus always already situated rather than brought down from the heavens. Further, to avoid
simplifying discipline divisions, many philosophers share, indeed inspire, these views. Searle
(1969; 2001; 2010) has long promoted the view that the speech act performance in the social
world is imbued with an internal deontology derived from the very semantics of speech acts and
“the institution of language.” In particular, in the world of conflicting individual desires and
overlapping social obligations, there can be no deductive logic of practical reason – and yet there
exists rationality in action (Searle, 2001). In his own way, Habermas (1984) captures this
embodied normativity by defining communicative rationality as grounded in the pragmatic
presuppositions governing rational-critical discussions allowing for a free and open critical
verification of arguers’ “validity claims” attached to speech acts.
Goodwin (2005), discussing Habermasian ideas via Rehg’s analysis, admits we might
never be in a position to conclusively determine whether the norms of argument are contextually
designed by arguers themselves in and through their situated argumentative transactions—or, by
contrast, they simply locally specify some stable and generalizable ideas of rationality
(Goodwin, 2005, esp. pp. 158-159). Her own work tilts strongly toward the first option.
However, even these argumentation scholars who define normativity of argumentation in terms
of universal and external philosophical ideal of critical rationality—such as pragma-dialecticians
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004)—would subscribe to the idea that: “Rational decision
making is not so much a matter of making the right decision, but one of making the decision
right” (Miller, 1994, p. 43, as cited in Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 49). Whether a “correct
procedure” (Chang, see above) contextually constitutes the grounds of reasonable argumentation,
or merely implements some general norms of reason constituted elsewhere, it does matter as an
indispensable vehicle for making the decision right. (As shown below, even Chang indirectly
admits that.)
So, how do we make the decision right without losing the sight of the theories, such as
comparativism, which supposedly offer objective normative grounds for the right decision? In
particular: Do we need objectively-minded, unbiased arguers or can we count on “good”
argumentative processes or procedures in which individual biases cancel each other out?
This is the question I will consider in this paper. To spoil the surprise, I will count myself
among those who count on “good” argumentative procedures to answer the question of the
grounds of practical reasoning. This is not to deny that good arguers are needed for such
procedures, and that argumentation has always an inescapable cognitive aspect which filters
through what argumentation eventually becomes, both descriptively and normatively (e.g.,
Hample, 2005).
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I will go about it as follows. Below, in section 2, I will present an extended schema of
practical argument I have been developing, which is compatible with the main tenets of
comparativism. Further, in section 3, I will argue that the context of well-structured advocacy is
an answer to the question of how the rationality of so conceived practical argument can be best
squeezed out, or grounded. Finally, in section 4 I will propose a tentative procedure for such a
context.
2. The structure of practical argument
Take a simple example of practical reasoning stolen from Goodwin (2013):
Assume you are shopping for one of the new-fangled, efficient but expensive light
bulbs at your local hardware store. While staring at the one of the multitude of
options, you receive this message: “You should buy it—it lasts a lot longer!” This
is an argument, and seems potentially relevant to your choice. But it suffers from
a fatal vagueness: longer than what? How do you fill in the missing information?
(p. 15)
This, clearly, is a practical argument: it concludes with an action-relevant speech act—“You
should buy it”: it can be advice, a recommendation, a call, etc.—rather than a fact-relevant
assertive (see Lewiński, 2016). Further, the only argument explicitly given here is a comparative
argument: “it lasts a lot longer.” We can easily phrase it in terms of a basic positive comparative
fact: Bulb X is better than Y with respect to longevity. The crucial unknown here is if we’re
dealing with a determinate set of alternatives over which we compare, that is, are we in a “wellformed choice situation” (Chang, 2016, p. 215)? We would indeed be, if the comparative “longer
than” pertained to “some light bulb that is directly relevant to your decision—perhaps the light
bulb you are currently using, or the light bulb of a different manufacturer that is comparable to
the one in question in every way except how long it lasts” (Goodwin, 2013, p. 15). If, by
contrast, “longer than” referred vaguely to “some light bulb or other—perhaps longer than one of
the manufacturer’s cheaper light bulbs, or longer than last year’s model” (p. 15) then we would
face a rather vague, suspiciously open set of options, which would eventually make comparisons
spurious (cf. “It lasts longer than Edison’s first bulb”). In the former case, we are in a position to
make a rational choice: all other things being equal, or at least “comparable,” longevity might be
the decisive, reasonable criterion. In the latter case, due to the ill-defined set of alternatives we
are prone to lapses in our practical rationality: the comparative fact that the bulb lasts longer than
a cheaper type of bulbs which “by definition” last much shorter, cannot reasonably ground our
choice. (The fact that the economy class ticket is cheaper than any business class ticket will not
help us much in choosing the best economy fare we are looking for. Etc.)
Goodwin’s original problem was how to reconstruct the rest of this overly laconic
argument. This is no easy undertaking. Yet I can see how this tiny bit of argumentation can—
indeed has to—be considered as a part of a much complex schema for practical argumentation.
This schema seems to comprehensively grasp all “the missing information” (Goodwin, 2013, p.
15) needed to analyse and evaluate this kind of argument. Below I will present its general
elements, using the lightbulb shopping as a running example.
The scheme of practical argument (PA) presented in Figure 1 stems from a rich literature
on practical argument in philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, and argumentation theory (see
3
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Lewiński, 2014; 2015; 2016 for a more detailed discussion). In particular, it is derived from a
recent comprehensive account of PA by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), who themselves are
indebted to Atkinson, Bench-Capon and McBurney, 2004, and Walton, 2007. While referring to
their work for an in-depth analysis of all the premises constituting the scheme (Circumstances,
Goal, Values), I will briefly mention some basic advantages of the scheme.
Figure 1: The scheme of Practical Argument
CONCLUSION: ACTION-RELEVANT SPEECH ACT
(PROPOSAL, PROMISE, ADVICE: e.g., LET’S DO M!)

GOAL (G):

CIRCUMSTANCES (C):

MEANS-GOAL (M-G):

A future state of
affairs in which our
actual concerns or
value commitments
are realized.

Context of action composed
of: natural facts, social and
institutional facts, e.g. value
commitments (duties,
promises).

Action M is the right means
to take us from C to G:
There are no better reasons
for proposing other actions.

VALUES (V):
We are actually
concerned with the
realization of V, or
we ought to be
concerned with the
realization of V
(V designates our
actual concerns or
our value
commitments).

M is Best: better than
any other actually or
potentially proposed
action {M, …, Z}.

It’s most in accordance with a
hierarchy of values and other
criteria applicable in the
given context of action.

M is
Satisfactory

M is
Necessary

M meets the
threshold set:
it’s good
enough

There Is
No
Alternative

Derived from: Fairclough & Fairclough (2012)
Possible, contextually-determined decision criteria:
direct or indirect costs and benefits (negative and beneficial consequences / side
effects)2⦁
opportunity costs ⦁
practical feasibility ⦁
ethical, moral, or legal implications ⦁
likelihood of realization or of success ⦁
conformance with other goals or strategies, their timing, duration, or location ⦁
(derived from: McBurney, Hitchcock, & Parsons, 2007, p. 99)

As I have argued before (Lewiński, 2015; 2016), the scheme distinguishes between contextindependent and context-dependent elements of PA. Its basic general structure (as per Fairclough
& Fairclough: all the white boxes in Figure 1) remains constant, while contextual criteria for
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choosing “the right means” (below the diagram) fluctuate.2 It also provides a new account of
how to criticise and evaluate PA. It clearly demarcates the attacks on the main premises
(Circumstances, Goals, Values, Means-Goals), from those concerning context-dependent
decision criteria, and from criticisms of the inference licences related to the type of the
inferential step made (necessary, satisfactory, or the best means). Further, the scheme defines its
conclusion in terms of a class of action-relevant speech acts, thus pointing to a “unity in
diversity” of what we can argue for in PA.
Two other features of the scheme are crucial to the current investigations. First, it
clarifies the notion of the means-goal premise. This premise is grounded in one of the three basic
inference licences warranting the choice of “the right means” taking us from the current
(unwelcome) Circumstances to the (desired) Goals: the means can be necessary, satisfactory
(good enough) or simply the best among all the possible, comparable alternatives. (These are
mutually exclusive, so we can follow only one of them at a time. See below for elaboration.)
Second, as I will argue below, the scheme shapes the framework of relevance for (multiparty) deliberation where advocacy is instrumental to making a reasonable decision. Typically,
different parties argue for the contextual betterness of their proposals for action {M, N, O… Z}
(see the “M is Best” box). Their deliberation develops then as an argumentative polylogue
(Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014) along the lines of possible disagreements over the various elements
of the structure (basic premises, inference rules and contextual criteria).
It is in these two features where comparativism takes hold of our exercise of practical
rationality. One of the three paths for justifying the means to be taken (“M is best”) is
straightforwardly based on comparison as the principle of reasonable choice.3 The advocacybased deliberation suggests a reasonable way to do it is to engage in exhaustive and critically
justified comparisons. I say “suggests” to acknowledge the possible leap in the dark between
making the decision right to making the right decision. Before moving on to this crucial point, I
will say something about the possible paths for justifying the choice of “the right” means.
As I argued before (Lewiński, 2015), the simplest formulation of the scheme of practical
reason does not really work, due to its incomplete take on the means-goal premise. The basic
scheme of practical reason discussed in philosophy and argumentation theory looks more or less
like that:
Let’s do X!
because
X leads to Y.
and
Y is our desired goal.

(Conclusion)
(Means-Goal premise)
(Goal premise)

That this scheme does not quite capture the rationality of PA can be shown by producing
arguments that clearly follow the scheme but are not so clearly rational:

These criteria are co-extensive with Chang’s (2016) “covering considerations.”
The two other paths are too based on comparisons, but in a less direct way. Realising that a given means is
necessary, requires its prior comparison to other – inefficient, inadmissible or unattainable – means, thus leaving this
means as the only, hence necessary, alternative for reaching the goal (possibly in conjunction with other means,
which can all be individually necessary, and jointly sufficient). The satisfactory path requires a comparison to a
threshold set in advance (“Any bulb of this kind cheaper than €10 is fine”). More on satisficing below.
2
3
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Let’s stop feeding our children!
because
This will save us lots of money.
and
We really need to start saving.
Here, from acceptable premises (the Goal of saving money is morally acceptable; the MeansGoal relation between stopping feeding children and saving money is technically speaking
correct in many contexts) we get a highly objectionable conclusion. That means that there is a
problem with the validity of the practical inference drawn here—and thus in the simple scheme
in general. What is missing is the “inference licence” regarding the quality of the link between
the desired goal (premise) and the proposed means of action (conclusion). The Means-Goal
inference needs to be thickened beyond asserting simple causality: “X leads to Y.”
One obvious option is to take X as a means necessary to reach Y. Whenever we want to
achieve Y, we have to do X. An exception occurs when X involves an objectionable (morally
unacceptable, too expensive) action, in which case we should abandon our goal.
While being the philosophers’ favourite, the necessary means is something of a
laboratory case. In real life, we typically have several alternative ways of reaching the goal, as
already recognised by Aristotle, who famously declared that if the desired end “seems to be
produced by several means they [deliberators] consider by which it is most easily and best
produced” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b12-15). Unsurprisingly, in practical philosophy there is a
long tradition of investigating what the right means might be. Briefly, when reasoning or arguing
over the Means to produce our Goals, we can licence our inference through one of the two basic
strategies (see Byron, 1998; 2004):
A)

i.

ii.

Going for “the best”: optimising / maximising. What “the best” is, is
typically contextually determined, sometimes loosely (when deciding
on the best place to take summer holidays), sometimes in a very strict,
administratively defined way (when deciding on the best public
procurement offer, or best job or grant application). While the general
criteria or parameters for selecting the best course of action can be
suggested (see the bottom of Figure 1, also: Hitchcock, 2011;
McBurney et al., 2007), their exact set, scope, precision and weight
depend on the context and cannot be pre-defined. Therefore, they
constitute the fluctuating conditions in the scheme of PA. One can,
however, distinguish between simple and subtle optimising:
Simple optimising applies when deliberators deal with a “static
context,” that is, when the set of alternative options (means of action)
is finite and known [Byron, 1998; this is what Chang (2016) calls a
“well-formed choice situation”]: we should simply take the best (most
efficient, beautiful, heavy-duty, cheapest) bulb from the display panel
in the shop.
Subtle optimising takes place when we are facing an ever-changing
“dynamic context” in which the set of options is open-ended and
constantly updated (Byron, 1998): Shall we buy the 2016 Philips bulbs
or wait a little for the 2017 Samsung line? What better offers can we
6
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get in the near future? Such risky questions (Hamblin, 1970, p. 216)
call for an on-going calculation of costs and benefits under uncertainty.
B)

i.

ii.

Going for the “good enough”: satisficing by setting a threshold which
will fulfil our basic criteria: “Any 10 Watt or less LED bulb for less
than € 10 is fine.” This, of course, is not the “best way all things
considered” but it is an important and reasonable way to licence
conclusions of our PA under many typical circumstances:
In dynamic contexts, satisficing lets us “economise” on resourceintensive subtle optimising, which requires constant updates and costbenefit analysis. (This plays to the “we are cognitive misers” argument
discussed below.)
In static contexts, it allows for global optimisation by letting us being
somewhat “easy” on less important local results: “Just take the € 9.99
Philips and let’s go, we have plenty of other things to do.”

In these ways, satisficing also falls under the “no better reasons” principle (see Figure 1). In
dynamic contexts, we (so far) have no better option than the one which first meets the threshold.
In static contexts, while locally merely satisficing, we might be optimising in terms of the bigger
plan.4
The basic inference licence in PA is then: there are no better reasons for proposing other
courses of action.5 Only when strengthened with this principle the “X leads to Y” Means-Goal
premise is properly licenced and the entire PA generates reasonable, even if expectedly
defeasible, results.
Apart from necessary and sufficient (either satisfactory or best) means, there is still one
more option, which is likely the most common and the least discussed kind of means we consider
in our PA. I have called them conducive means in order to convey their presumed worthiness in
approaching the desired Goal, despite their being neither necessary nor sufficient means
(Lewiński, 2014, p. 6). Conducive means should be considered against a disjunction of other
alternatives (for they are not necessary) and in conjunction with other means (for they are not
sufficient). Examples of such means are plenty: “In order to cut household spending I should buy
some new energy-saving LED lightbulbs.” Clearly, LED lightbulbs are not a necessary means to
save money. Instead, I can quit smoking, stop buying books I’ll never read, or find a Portuguese
girlfriend rather than pay for expensive private classes of Portuguese. Likewise, it is not a
sufficient means: alone, even super-efficient LED bulbs will not save me all that much. Still,
when supported with other premises of the scheme of PA, and as part of a bigger plan, buying a
set of new energy-saving and long-lasting bulbs for the entire house might be not a bad
conclusion at all. It might be more efficient, or less painful or troublesome than quitting
smoking, books and my current girlfriend. Or it might just save me per annum the sum I’m
4

For similar reasons, it has been argued (e.g., Byron, 1998) that satisficing is eventually a species of optimisation,
as it aims at finding the optimal balance between overall costs (effort, time, other resources) and benefits
(satisfaction of preferences and values) of our actions.
Chang (2016, p. 231ff.) criticises this way of defining rational choice—which she calls “maximalism”—on the
account that it is based on a negative (no better reasons, not worse) rather than a positive comparative fact (better
than, equal to). However, with some uncontroversial additional assumptions (not worse iff better than or equal to),
both views are compatible in this respect.
5
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looking to save. Shortly, whether because it is an optimal or a satisfactory means, it takes us
some way from current Circumstances to the Goal and is thus presumably reasonable.
Following all this, we arrive at the following types of inferences licencing our PA:
a)
b)
c)

Doing X is necessary to get to Y
Doing X is sufficient (and best / good enough way) to get to Y
Doing X is conducive (and best / good enough way) to get to Y

3. Two basic ways to design practical argumentation
3.1. Solo reasoning vs. collective argumentation
Traditionally, there are at least two views on how we produce the practical argument, both
traceable to Aristotle. In general, Aristotle’s view that we should go for the “most easily and best
produced” means (Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b15) can be considered an early version of
comparativism. Our choice of the right means, as evidenced in these considerations being a part
of the Nicomachean Ethics, can in the first place be understood in terms of an individual
cognitive-ethical process. An agent needs to possess certain intellectual and ethical virtues to be
able to fully exercise his practical reason, not least phronesis, the practical wisdom. In today’s
language, we would say that an arguer is reasonable in virtue of being open-minded, critical,
unbiased, knowledgeable (etc.). Diligent development and exercise of these qualities is what
makes the use of practical reason potentially reasonable, as reasonable as it gets for the human
scale. If this is all right, then “solo reasoning by a single agent” embodies the model of practical
reasoning in its purity (Hitchcock, 2011). This is the first view on where to search for the
normative grounds of practical reasoning.
However, Aristotle prefaces his proto-comparativism with a telling disclaimer: “We call
in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal
to deciding” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b11). To those seeking the path to rationality in an
undisturbed, clear and distinct individual mind, this is puzzling. But not to all. Dascal (2005)
argues that Aristotle was deliberately vague on the distinction between private (internal) and
public (collective) deliberation as chief activities of practical reason, in order to expose “a deep
analogy between his conceptions of the two domains” (p. 52). Moreover, an individualistic
approach to practical argument runs the risk of being “solipsistic, egoistic and anti-social”
(Hitchcock, 2002), so the grounds of practical argument are best found in dialogical practices of
argumentation where collective values, goals, and institutions are duly considered in a critical
argumentative discussion.6 When we distrust ourselves on the rationality of our decisions, we
then better resort to some critical, and thus corrective, exchange with others. This is the second
view.
A number of arguments give substance to the claim that the way to get to a reasonable
decision based on a critically tested practical argument, is to put it to the test of collective
deliberation where arguers act as advocates of the possible alternatives. Several vivid metaphors
have been in circulation to make this point.
6
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different intellectual context: the collective view (2002) transpires from a critical commentary on Pollock’s concept
of practical reason for an automated agent, while the individual view (2011) itself tries to establish a simple model
of instrumental rationality for artificial intelligence.
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One is that of a council. Dascal quotes a passage from Stuart Hampshire, where
Aristotle’s vagueness, perhaps continuity, between the internal (individual) and external
(collective) deliberation is portrayed in terms of a mind as “a council chamber, in which the
agent’s contrary interests are represented around the table, each speaking for itself” (Hampshire,
1991, p. 51, as quoted in Dascal, 2005, p. 70, n. 13). The “council members” thus advocate for
“their” interests contrary to “other members’” interests before “the chairman”—the will. We can
presume that having heard the best arguments made for each member’s interests, the chairman
gains enough insight to issue a reasoned decision to be acted on.
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958/1969) take up similar imagery and claim not only
simple similarity between public and private deliberation but rather primacy of the former over
the latter:
[…] inward deliberation […] appears to be constructed on the model of deliberation
with others. Hence, we must expect to find carried over to this inner deliberation
most of the problems associated with the conditions necessary for discussion with
others. […] Accordingly, from our point of view, it is by analyzing argumentation
addressed to others that we can best understand self-deliberation, and not vice
versa. (pp. 14, 41)
This sounds familiar enough to rhetoricians and dialecticians who approach argumentation as a
communicative process, procedure or transaction (Wenzel, 1990; Goodwin, 2005). However,
both those who claim that investigations into the normative nature of practical reason have little
to do with the human activity of reasoning or argumentation and those who claim they primarily
pertain to an individual mind, might need an additional argument.
As we have seen with the case of Chang’s approach, external considerations of
deliberative procedures are far-removed from the core of the matter, the very grounds of the
reasonable. Yet, little cracks where argumentation scholars can stuck their fingers in, do appear.
Consider Chang’s (2016) picture of how the rationality of practical reason is grounded:
According to comparativism, alternatives must “do battle” in the arena of reasons.
Whichever alternatives emerge as victors can be rationally chosen. Or less
violently: the alternatives “meet and discuss” which of them will go forth into the
world of intention and action. The ones that go forward as a result of that
discussion can be rationally chosen. […] In short, comparativism holds that what
makes a choice rational is some achievement, a stamp of approval, a gold star. (p.
234).
The battle of alternatives or a discussion over them are procedures or designs for argumentation.
They can take two different shapes: one closer to the discussion, another closer to the battle.
This, also, is no news to argumentation scholars.
3.2. Issue-based deliberation vs. role-based advocacy
How can we reasonably compare alternatives and decide on the best one through collective
practical argumentation? There are, of course, hundreds of ways to do it, but two broad ways
have been distinguished.
9
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I have described one of them as an issue-based dialectics (Lewiński, forthcoming). A
well-known historical precedence is Cicero’s argumentum in utramque partem aimed at a
“balanced consideration of alternatives” (Schofield, 2008, p. 64). Today, Walton and others
would call it a deliberation dialogue (Walton & Krabbe, 1995, ch. 3; Walton, 1998, ch. 6;
McBurney, Hitchcock, & Parsons, 2007; Atkinson, Bench-Capon, & Walton, 2013). Blair
(2016), capturing a similar concept, brands it as inquiry (while also pondering exploration and
discovery).
The basic idea is this: on every issue there are two sides—pro and con. Hence, to
properly examine or decide on an issue is to juxtapose opposing arguments for and against it.
Discussing many options on an issue amounts to pooling all possible pro and con arguments on
each option. The basic assumption is that a deliberative discussion starts with an open problem.
The “openness” of the problem means that discussants do not enter deliberation with a defined
position on it and that they do not defend the superiority of “their” position by making a case,
that is, by advancing arguments that consistently support the position. Rather, each participant is
supposed to give pro and con reasons on each possible solution to the open problem, and to
welcome the final weighing of reasons without being committed to one “best” option all along
(see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Issue-based weighing of pros and cons
Option 1
+
+
+
+

Option 2
-

(+2)

+
+

Option 3
-

(-1)

+
+
+

(0)

A

B
C
D
E
(+ are pro reasons, - are con reasons; A-E are five deliberators who contribute their reasons pro and con the options
without openly supporting any of them.)

The second approach to collective deliberations can instead be called role-based
dialectics, since it sees multi-party deliberation as a clash between arguers fulfilling their
dialectical roles, or personae (Lewiński, forthcoming). The most famous historical example are
Socratic dialogues, where each interlocutor defends his own case in order to convince others of
it, while trying to catch them on an inconsistency or other fault (Schofield, 2008). With all due
theoretical differences acknowledged, this is what Walton et al. call a persuasion dialogue
(Walton & Krabbe, 1995, chs. 3-4; Walton, 1998: Ch. 2; Prakken, 2009; Atkinson, BenchCapon, & Walton, 2013), pragma-dialecticians a critical discussion (van Eemeren &
Grootendorst, 2004), and Blair (2016) simply advocacy. The basic commonality is this: one role
(protagonist, proponent) amounts to consistently upholding a position against possible opposing
positions and critical questioning of the bearers of the other role (antagonists, opponents).
Arguments are thus co-defined with dialectical roles of argumentative parties, rather than with
dialectical issues detached from any recognisable advocates (see Figure 3). Arguers’ task is to
make a strong and consistent “case” in the sense of marshalling arguments that support “their”
position, doing away with doubts, and rebutting criticisms. To use Atkinson et al.’s (2013)
expression—in what they theorise as persuasion dialogues over actions—positions and
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arguments are “owned” or “championed” by discussants. By contrast, in deliberation
dialogues—which exemplify an issue-based approach – “there should be no ‘ownership’ of
options” (Atkinson et al., 2013, p. 123).
Deliberation understood as a role-based exchange is a decision-making activity in which
positions are clearly defined and explicitly advocated by given parties, who need to be mindful
all along to remain consistent in their argumentative commitments.7 The goal is to select, upon
critical examination, “the best” of these positions.8 There are thus “winners” and “losers.”
Figure 3: Role-based clash of contrary positions
A

C

B

D

E

4. Advocacy-based model for practical argumentation
4.1. To inquire or to advocate?
Which way should we go, then? Goodwin (2013) suggests that informal logicians will in general
be suspicious of advocacy, on the account that for epistemic argumentative jobs it “will be taken
as biased, irrelevant and possibly even fallacious” (p. 2). An example of this is Blair, who
advocates against the advocacy model and for the inquiry, largely based on his personal
experience. He recalls “meetings when members’ advocacy argumentation produced or
reinforced divisions in the group and blocked opportunities for open-minded investigations of
alternatives” (Blair, 2016, p. 53). However, Grasso’s (2016) smart response to Blair’s paper
strongly suggests that properly, “systematically” designed argumentative models of inquiry
(discovery) and advocacy would yield “almost indistinguishable results”: both “would require a
comprehensive and exhaustive exploration of all possibilities: all options are considered in the
discovery process, all voices are heard in the advocacy process” (p. 71). Assuming that she’s
right, the issue then is that of a proper argumentation design (Aakhus & Jackson, 2005; Jackson,
2015).
But there are reasons tilting the solution towards advocacy. Blair himself mentions that
this is how most groups argue by default, whether by adopting explicit rules of order for
7

By contrast, in issue-based activities, participants can be inconsistent, as they are allowed—even expected or
obligated—to advance pro and con arguments for each alternative, criticise and retract the arguments they
suggested, and freely change their mind regarding each alternative.
8
In the longer perspective, argumentative testing of positions might also pave the way for (an) entirely new
position(s) to emerge, through a dialectical synthesis of sorts.
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advocacy (such as Robert’s Rules of Order) or simply because quickly enough “the pro and con
advocacy begins” in typical group meetings (Blair, 2016, p. 60). A good normative pragmatic
designer would surely take this into account—rather than go against this “natural” tendency.
Anecdotal empirical evidence aside, there are important theoretical reason to try to model
practical argumentation in terms of advocacy. To start with, decisions where various voices are
heard through advocacy easier gain the crucial facet of democratic legitimacy when compared to
decisions somewhat abstractly (or even paternalistically), “rationally considered” in detachment
from actual parties claiming stake in the issue (Benhabib, 1994). Further, advocacy might aid us
in being cognitive misers; it allows us “to outsource some of the time-consuming and wearisome
activity of reasoning to someone who is zealous about it” (Goodwin, 2013, p. 16).
Within the framework suggested here, it is crucial that advocacy is more readily
consistent with comparativism and the model of practical argument presented above. In models
of issue-based deliberation à la Blair, first the rational pooling of arguments for and against each
option takes place—and only once this is done, the options are compared (see also McBurney et
al., 2007). Comparisons are thus consequences of arguments—rather than grounds of arguments,
as they rationally should be. Following our lightbulb example: The fact that the bulb lasts 10%
longer than some kind of a standard bulb sounds like a pro-argument. But until we have the
proper comparison, it remains utterly empty. Do new competitive bulbs last 30% or 3% longer?
If 30%, then our bulb is a weak contender on this account, and the argument is in fact a conargument. It is clear, then, that the basic comparative relations (better than, worse than, equally
good) operate at the very core of the practical argument in the first place—rather than in the
final, post-argumentative “summation”. In Blair’s procedure, they should belong to Task 2:
Investigation using arguments, rather than Task 3: Summation and application, where they are
now.
4.2. How to advocate in practical argumentation
One can start thinking of an advocacy procedure for practical argumentation in terms of the
existing role-based dialectical models but extended to incorporate the clash of more than just two
positions on an issue; in this way, the model will be a model of a polylogue (Lewiński, 2014;
Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014). Such a procedure can be constructed in a largely formal manner or
informally, using the extant pragmatically-oriented dialectical approaches as a basic theoretical
background. The pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion may be particularly useful in
this endeavour as a well-defined normative account of everyday argumentation. It offers a useful
heuristic of dividing argumentative discussions into four “dialectical stages”: confrontation,
opening, argumentation, and concluding (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 57ff.). The
four stages can define the procedure for multi-party argumentation in general (Lewiński &
Aakhus, 2014), but they can also be crafted to advocacy-based deliberation in particular. In the
latter case, the scheme of practical argument expounded in section 2 can serve as the pattern of
relevance for all argumentative moves in deliberation. What is offered below, are procedural
rules and guidelines, without any strong claim regarding their individual normative status and
systemic closeness.
To start with, the confrontation and opening stages are intertwined, and possibly opening
comes analytically first—a marked difference from the pragma-dialectical critical discussion,
where confrontation is the first ideal step.
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Opening:
1. What is at stake? What is the issue?
1a. Arrive at a satisfactory representation of Circumstances: the issue to be
tackled.
1b. Define the Goals: future desired states of affairs.
1c. Define the Values which justify the goals and, possibly, also shape the
perspective on circumstances and constrain the choice of means.
1d. Decide on the basic principle of means selection in case of non-necessary
means: optimising or satisficing.
1e. Decide on the contextually-relevant criteria for realising the values and
selecting the optimal or satisfactory means.
Instrumental practical argumentation in a strict sense is one in which these premises are agreed
in advance and are held constant: so that we argue solely about the means to be adopted. In
reality, of course, this hardly ever happens, so argumentation would develop in all these
directions. (All these elements would be kicked back and forth between opening and
argumentation.)
Confrontation
Now, given the circumstances, goals, values, and criteria deliberators are in a position to ask:
2. What shall we do (with this issue)?
Or:
2’. What is the best means to take us from the current circumstances to the desired
goals?9
2a. Examine the nature of the issue:
2a1. A yes/no question? (“Shall we take the Philips bulb?”)
2a2. An alternative question / (safe) Wh-question: the set of relevant alternatives is
finite and known to the arguers (“Shall we take Philips, Samsung or Osram bulb?”
/ “Which of the bulbs from the display panel shall we take?”)
2a3. An open (risky) Wh-question: the set of relevant alternatives is open-ended
(“Which of the new lightbulbs shall we buy?”)
2b. Gather all the possible proposals: Let us do m, n, o, ..., z.
Of course, 2b and 2a2-2a3 are cross-determined.
2c. Determine the nature of proposals: What is the proposal implying?

9

I limit myself henceforth to the strategy of optimising, leaving aside the satisficing options.
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2c1. Determine its illocutionary force (see Lewiński, 2016):
1)
Strong, with the highest level of commitment when: “the
proposer must openly commit herself to speak in defense of her
resolution” (Kauffeld, 1998, p. 249)
2)
Neutral, when the proponent is committed to the proposal as a
serious consideration/option for deliberators: “inducement to
tentative consideration” (Kauffeld, 1998, p. 250)
3)
Weak, when the proposal is a mere, tentative “suggestion” (as in
“brainstorming sessions”: McBurney et al., 2007, p. 100, 116;
Walton, 2006, pp. 216-217).
Here, as noted above, I am dealing mostly with 1) and 2) – situations of advocacy in
deliberation. A proponent has thus an obligation to advocate the positions she proposes to take—
that is to say, once the proposal (and not merely a suggestion) is made, advocacy is needed.
Overall, there seems to be a continuum: from pure brainstorming or “thinking aloud” without
strong commitment and with strong cancelability (level 3), to proposing something as a serious
consideration (level 2), to strongly defending one’s proposal/choice, presumably made upon best
prior consideration of an issue (level 1). It might be hard to say where deliberation (as opposed
to persuasion or negotiation dialogues) starts and ends, especially when the level of commitment
fluctuates over the course of discussion (diachronic variation) and across various participants
(synchronic variation). In such cases, any clear-cut demarcating line would be arbitrary (as I
think is in Atkinson et al., 2013 and Walton, 2006). This model thus takes a maximally
advocacy-based interpretation of deliberation as a position-defending-and-attacking
argumentative activity. Timid arguers are best advised to instead follow Blair’s (2016) inquiry
model.
2c2. Determine the proposal’s propositional content
1)
My position is that means m is necessary.
If not, then:
2)
My position is that means m is sufficient and best.
If not, then:
3)
My position is that means m is conducive and best.
Having made all this clear, deliberators can move to the third stage:
Argumentation
At this stage, in strictly instrumental PA, the presuppositions of proposals advocating the
necessary or best means (as expressed in the means-goal premise) are debated vis-à-vis the
circumstances, goals, values, and contextual criteria defined at the opening stage. In the case of
sufficient and conducive means, the presuppositions are precisely the components of the
“bestness” of the advocated means; they constitute the sub-premises of the means-goal premise.
A proponent of a given option should, depending on contextual constraints, be able to defend any
of the qualities of the advocated option (see Figure 1, following McBurney et al., 2007, p. 99):
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direct or indirect costs and benefits, their opportunity costs, their consequences, their practical
feasibility, etc.
The crucial guideline is at this stage is:
3. Construct your main arguments in terms of comparative facts:
Option m is better than n with respect to {costs and benefits, feasibility,
moral / aesthetic values, conformance with other goals or strategies, …}
Eventually, the argumentation stage should return a set of comparative facts, critically tested in
the back-and-forth of the competitive argumentative discussion.
Concluding
This brings us to the problems of concluding the discussion on the basis of the results of the
argumentative procedures. In a dyadic discussion, this is a fairly straightforward business, since
arguers can choose from but two options: that “the protagonist’s standpoint is acceptable and the
antagonist’s doubt must be retracted, or that the standpoint of the protagonist must be retracted”
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 61). Such a limitation to duality is an all-too-common
trick in the literature (see Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014 for an overview). Witness Chang’s (2016)
strategy who, upfront, declares that: “To simplify, I will henceforth treat choice situations as
involving only two alternatives” (p. 215).
In a multi-party discussion—a polylogue—since there are by definition many
protagonists of distinct positions and thus also many distinct antagonists, the choices may be
plenty. One alternative can simply be better than any other, which allows for a clear conclusion
(the Bingo! case). But some positions can be better on, let us assume, an equal amount of equally
important considerations, which possibly leads to a standoff. Arguers may also decide to “sum
up” all the conclusions of extracted dyadic arguments through “pairwise comparisons” suggested
by Blair (2016, p. 66) and Chang. This applies especially in the case where they decide to split
their procedure into a sequence of dual pro-et-contra encounters: Shall we do m? Shall we do n?
Shall we do o? Dialectically speaking, such local concluding stages seem the most viable option,
but the final evaluation of the entire multi-party deliberation may face a number of problems
(Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014). One of them is that more than one such sub-discussion ends with a
yes resolution, while only one course of action can be taken. Another is that all options are
objectionable for one reason or another, and the end result is nothing but a series of nos. Finally,
there is the difficulty mentioned above: if dyads directly compare two proposals (Shall we do m
or n? Etc.), each proposal can be once better and once worse, making it hard to decide on a
single “best” option (m > n > o > m). Some novel methods of concluding complex polylogues are
yet to be developed—especially if the ideal modelling aims at grasping some form of a
reasonable “resolution,” rather than mere “settling” of deliberations, for instance through voting
or preference-aggregation—which, by the way, generate their own well-known issues such as a
50-50 vote or Condorcet cases.
So far, then, the best guideline for concluding advocacy-based deliberations is:
4. Use any method of concluding suggested by Jean Goodwin in her commentary.
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5. Conclusion
So where is the reasonableness of practical argument?
It can be grounded in some abstract ideal detached from actual practical argumentation,
such as proposed by Chang. Or it can be constituted in practical reasoning or argumentation. In
the former case, reasoning or argumentation can better or worse approach the ideal; in the latter
it can better or worse ground the ideal. Let us give up the hope of deciding which one is the case.
We are still left with the same (meta-theoretical) comparative, normative framework, though: in
both cases we can do it better or worse. Clear and distinct—or: objective and unbiased—solo
practical reasoning is one way to do it better, rather than worse. Collective argumentation is
another, where we can go for more co-operative inquiry or open deliberation— or for more
competitive advocacy or dialectics.
I have argued here that the last option is empirically adequate and theoretically
consistent. When properly designed, advocacy becomes what we would consider a reasonable
dialectical argument at large: diligent, even zealous, argumentation in defence of a contested
thesis, yet within the bounds of some mutually recognised rules and constraints (Goodwin,
2013). A victor in such a benevolent battle is then not just some alternative or other, but the
rationality itself (that’s Aristotle). Even if not exclusively, a rational choice can be the end result
of an advocacy procedure.
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